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Theories of Social Norms 
For more than a century, Homo economicus has exclusively populated 
the theoretical world of economics. This model of the rationally self- 
interested actor has also come to dominate substantial subfields of po- 
litical science, sociology, law, and philosophy. However, many theorists 
doubt whether this model can explain most social phenomena unless it 
is supplemented with more socially sophisticated elements, such as so- 
cial and ethical values, altruism, and desires for social status. Among 
these theorists are Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman, who have pub- 
lished the results of such supplementation by various contributors in 
Economics, Values, and Organization. The contributors ask: Why and 
when do people cooperate? How do social norms evolve? How do values 
and incentives interact and influence social organizations and market 
outcomes? 
These questions lead to one of the central puzzles of social theory: 
that of explaining why people comply with social norms.’ A social norm 
is a standard of behavior shared by a social group, commonly under- 
stood by its members as authoritative or obligatory for them. Social 
norms differ from moral norms: they need not have moral content or be 
viewed as morally obligatory (consider norms of fashion). Nor are they 
the same as norms of rationality, which apply to the individual as such, 
A review of Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman, eds., Economics, Values, and Organi- 
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1. This essay largely sets aside related grand problems of social theory, such as explain- 
ing the content of social norms or why they change over time. 
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regardless of group membership. Yet, they still appear to be backed by 
some kind of normative force. Let us call this understanding of group 
members that they all ought to obey the standard of conduct defined by 
a social norm the normativity of the norm. Social norms are also typi- 
cally enforced by sanctions such as praise and blame, social inclusion 
and exclusion. The normativity of the norm is whatever members of the 
social group appeal to in holding one another accountable to it and 
justifying the imposition of sanctions. 
Social theory today offers three broad strategies for explaining why 
people comply with social norms. (1) Rational choice theory uses the 
model of Homo economicus. It explains behavior in conformity with so- 
cial norms as the product of the strategic interactions of instrumentally 
rational, self-interested individuals. (2) Evolutionary theory uses models 
of biological or cultural evolution. It explains conformity to social 
norms as the expression of heritable genetic or cultural traits that have 
differential success in replicating themselves due to some selective 
process. (3) The third explanatory strategy uses models of Homo sociol- 
ogicus-what I shall call here “social” or “cultural” rationality. It ex- 
plains conformity to social norms in terms of the normativity of norms, 
and grounds that normativity in the ways individuals see norms as 
meaningfully expressing their social identities, their relationships to 
other people, or shared intentions and values.2 
These three explanatory strategies each bear a different relation to the 
point of view of the agent. Evolutionary theory takes a point of view 
external to the agent. A norm could spread because of selective pres- 
sures that work independently of whatever their adherents see as bind- 
ing them to obey it. Social rationality explains social norms from the 
adherents’ own point of view. On this view, most people have internal- 
ized the norm and will obey it because of its normativity, apart from the 
sanctions attached to it. Rational choice theory represents individuals 
as taking a more alienated posture toward social norms. Although they 
may see that general conformity to a norm would be desirable, this does 
not provide them with a reason to conform, so long as personal confor- 
mity is, on net, costly to each agent. Only incentives contingently at- 
tached to the norm could provide a rational, self-interested individual 
a reason to conform. A person’s reasons for conformity are thus external 
2. I shall explain below how these ideas are related in one account of social rationality. 
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to the normativity of the norm, incidental to whatever might make its 
adherents approve of general conformity to it. 
Amartya Sen argues that these three explanatory strategies are com- 
plementary, not mutually exclusive.3 A norm could be followed both 
because of its perceived intrinsic merits and because of incentives. Its 
perceived intrinsic merits could include both prudential and imper- 
sonal goods. It could even have been established by the forces of both 
mindless selective pressures and deliberate institution. Sen is correct. 
But his bid for peace among competing schools of social theory ob- 
scures dependency relations among the different explanatory strategies. 
I shall argue that the normativity of norms plays an indispensable role 
in accounting for the motive to comply with them. Rational choice ex- 
planations of norms are dependent on social rationality. This conclu- 
sion draws upon the theories and evidence provided by Economics, Val- 
ues, and Organization, while pressing most of its contributors to be even 
bolder in challenging the model of Homo economicus. 
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ABOUT HUMAN MOTIVATION 
Orthodox rational choice theory attempts to explain social outcomes by 
assuming only the characteristics of Homo economicus: instrumental 
rationality and self-interest. Cast as methodological principles, these as- 
sumptions have considerable appeal. Methodological rationalism-the 
principle that we should try to explain people’s actions as rational be- 
fore resorting to explanations that represent them as irrational-is a 
sound starting point for social theory. The widespread normative appeal 
of the economic theory of rational choice therefore supports its use as 
the default theory for explaining human behavior. The theory can also 
be axiomatized and facilitates formal, quantitative modeling of human 
behavior. Methodological egoism-the principle that we should try to 
explain people’s actions as self-interested before accepting their typi- 
cally more flattering self-representations-supports the critical, un- 
masking function of social theory. Also, given that self-interest is one of 
our primary motives, a theory that could explain all human behavior 
without resort to other motivations could lay a claim to greater parsi- 
3. Amartya Sen, “Foreword,” in EVO, pp. vii-xiii. 
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mony. How far do these assumptions advance our understanding be- 
fore we must resort to alternative explanations? 
With respect to the hypothesis of expected utility maximization, the 
answer is: not far. We are not very good at judging probabilities; we do 
not think about risks in the way decision theorists think we ought; we 
do not order our preferences consistently; we care about sunk costs; and 
we systematically violate just about every logical implication of decision 
theory.4 There is probably no other hypothesis about human behavior 
so thoroughly discredited on empirical grounds that still operates as a 
standard working assumption in any discipline. This is not for lack of 
alternatives. Theories of bounded rationality, prospect theory, social ra- 
tionality, and other alternatives are on hand.5 
The contributors to EVO are more concerned with the self-interest 
hypothesis. A person’s motive is self-interested only if she seeks a goal 
out of love for hersev Any action-causing attitude toward any person or 
thing other than love for oneself-even if it happens to advance one’s 
self-interest-is a motive distinct from self-interest. What other motives 
do we have besides self-interest? Jane Mansbridge argues for three basic 
human motives: self-interest, love of others, and duty.6 Ben-Ner and 
Putterman advocate a similar scheme of self-regarding, other-regard- 
ing, and process-regarding preferences, except that they recognize that 
others may be regarded unfavorably.7 Their scheme recognizes that ac- 
tions out of hatred toward others are not self-interested. People may, 
out of hatred, accept their own destruction in the process of destroying 
4. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncer- 
tainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Choices, Values, and Frames,” American Psychologist 39 
(1984): 341-50; Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, “Experimental Tests 
of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): 
1325-48; Richard Thaler, The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life 
(New York Free Press, 1992). 
5. Mary Zey, ed., Decision Making: Alternatives to Rational Choice Models (Newbury 
Park Sage Publications, 1992); Herbert Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1982); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk,” Econometricu 47 (1979): 263-91; Martin Hollis, The Cunning of Reu- 
son (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
6. Jane Mansbridge, “Starting with Nothing: On the Impossibility of Grounding Norms 
Solely in Self-Interest,’’ in EVO, pp. 151-68. 
7. Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman, “Values and Institutions in Economic Analy- 
sis,” in EVO, pp. 20--22. 
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their enemies. All three authors rightly distinguish fair dealing from love 
of others. One can, out of a sense of duty, pay back one’s debts to some- 
one one hates. 
A more complete scheme of motives would recognize several addi- 
tional facts. First, almost any attitude toward others can also be self- 
directed, even if it is negative. One may undermine one’s self-interest 
out of self-loathing or shame. Second, we have other favorable self-re- 
garding attitudes that sometimes conflict with self-love. Out of pride, 
some people refuse charity, even though this brings them to ruin. Third, 
almost any attitude toward self or others can be taken toward groups 
including oneself. Thus arise various “we-regarding” motivations, such 
as ethnic pride and shame, patriotism, and friendship. These motives do 
not sharply distinguish the welfare of the agent from the welfare of the 
group. 
Still other motives are not oriented toward persons or their welfare at 
all. People act out of regard for animals, plants, and things. Some have 
high achievement motivation-the desire to excel in practices such as 
athletics, music, and the professions-which they pursue at the expense 
of self-interest. We share with animals various appetites and drives such 
as hunger, thirst, and curiosity. These motives need not advance the 
individual’s interests. Curiosity killed the cat, and our health suffers 
today from what may be a genetically programmed desire for fatty 
foods. Whatever their effects, such motives cannot be self-regarding be- 
cause they are also possessed by animals too primitive to have a sense 
of self. 
This incomplete catalogue of motives offers numerous conceptual al- 
ternatives to self-interest. Social scientists have developed sophisticated 
empirical tests capable of distinguishing self-interest from such mo- 
tives, to the detriment of the self-interest hypothesis. Mansbridge dis- 
cusses an ingenious series of experiments, designed by the psychologist 
Daniel Batson, that elicited helping behavior from strangers in contexts 
that ruled out nonaltruistic explanations for it-for example, the desire 
to avoid feelings of guilt, to avoid distress at seeing others suffer, or to 
obtain social approvaL8 
Social scientists have focused more intensively on cooperation, fair- 
ness, reciprocity, and trust than altruism. Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter 
8. Mansbridge, “Starting with Nothing,” pp. 158-59. 
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discuss experiments, using real monetary payoffs, in which subjects en- 
gaged in reciprocal cooperation (tit-for-tat) in contexts in which coop- 
eration and retaliation came at a net cost to the agent, and without op- 
portunities to build a reputation for reciprocity.9 Their results contra- 
dict the rational choice prediction that people will never live up to, and, 
knowing this, will never offer, incompletely enforceable contracts. Fehr 
and Gachter found that people playing the role of firms commonly offer 
wages considerably higher than the returns they could expect from the 
enforceable level of worker effort. People playing the role of workers 
respond to this generosity by making considerably higher efforts than 
the minimum required to obtain their promised wage. Aggregate effort 
levels are lower than what firms demand, indicating that self-interest 
plays some role in determining contractual compliance. But they are 
much higher than what self-interest alone would produce. Firms punish 
shirking and reward diligence when given the opportunity to do so, even 
when this is costly and there is no prospect of further interaction with 
their workers. 
These results show that people are willing to cooperate, reward coop- 
eration, and punish uncooperative behavior, even when it is not in their 
self-interest to do so, and that they correctly believe that others are will- 
ing to do the same. Fehr and Gachter explain their results by postulating 
that people respond not just to bare incentives but to their interpreta- 
tion of the intentions others express toward them in offering incentives. 
Generous and fair-minded intentions elicit generous and fair-minded 
behavior. 
Trust appears to be a key factor behind the willingness to cooperate. 
The norm of trust tells people to act as if they believe others will recipro- 
cate their own cooperation. It is expressed in a persistent willingness to 
put oneself at risk, even in the face of short-term losses due to failures 
to reach cooperative equilibria with one’s group.’O Under what condi- 
tions are people willing to act on trust-to put forward costly efforts in 
the hope that others will too, when high efforts from the group are the 
only way to achieve high gains for the group? Andrew Schotter’s experi- 
mental work shows that this willingness depends on the group’s prior 
history of cooperation or failure to cooperate, on the ease of coordinat- 
9. Ernst Fehr and Simon Gkhter, “How Effective Are Trust- and Reciprocity-Based In- 
10. Jonathan Baron, “Trust: Beliefs and Morality,” in EVO, pp. 408-18. 
centives?” in EVO, pp. 337-63. 
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ing everyone’s actions around a high-effort equilibrium in multiple- 
equilibrium games, and on the vulnerability of individuals to steep 
losses if others fail to put forth comparable eff0rts.l’ 
Fehr, Gachter, and Schotter’s work contributes to an expanding vol- 
ume of experimental evidence that, under a wide range of conditions, 
people act cooperatively, and obey and enforce norms of fairness even 
against their self-interest.12 Despite this, Homo economicus remains a 
dominant framework for explaining norms. So let us consider the theo- 
retical prospects for generating a cooperative social order on the basis 
of rational self-interest alone. Most theoretical work in this paradigm 
builds on three basic models: (1) coordination conventions, (2) repeated 
game theory, and (3) sanctioning. The contributors to EVO explore all 
three models, and thus offer an excellent view of their prospects. One 
of the themes to emerge from my examination of their prospects is that 
rational choice explanations of compliance with social norms do not 
have sufficient generality: they explain the normative compliance of ac- 
tors only in a restricted range of settings, or explain the compliance of 
some actors only given that most people’s compliance must be ex- 
plained by other factors. 
11. RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND SOCIAL NORMS (I): CONVENTION 
The theory of conventions explains the emergence of norms in coordi- 
nation games. In such games there are at least two rules such that each 
agent prefers that if all but one person follows a given rule, then the 
remaining person follow it too. The problem is to fix the rule by which 
everyone will cooperate. In the classic case of a convention, it must be 
determined whether everyone shall drive on the right or the left side of 
the road. Once this determination is made, either by explicit agreement 
or spontaneous convergence on a salient rule, the convention is very 
stable, because no one has an interest in deviating from it all by herself, 
everyone has an interest in there being some convention, and it is costly 
to try to change the convention once it is established.l3 
11. Andrew Schotter, “Worker Trust, System Vulnerabilitjr, and the Performance of Work 
Groups,” in EVO, pp. 364-407. 
12. See, for example, Robyn Dawes, Alphonse van de Kragt, and John Orbell, “Coopera- 
tion for the Benefit of Us--Not Me, or My Conscience,” in Jane Mansbridge, ed., Beyond 
Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
13. David Lewis, Convention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). 
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The rational choice theory of conventions is widely regarded as a suc- 
cess.l4 However, most theorists regard its domain to be narrow, because 
the payoff structure of most social problems gives some people an in- 
centive to deviate from the norm. Against this, Russell Hardin argues 
that coordination conventions offer the key to the great puzzle of how 
organizations get their individual members to follow organizational 
goals, as opposed to their own personal goals. Hardin claims that the 
operating rules of organizations constitute conventions, general confor- 
mity to which makes it costly for any single individual to deviate from 
them, and costly for any subgroup of them to change. For example, 
congressional committees constitute a coordination equilibrium. It is 
too costly for members of Congress to try to replace the committee 
structure with an alternative, even if the committees in place are block- 
ing legislation that a majority wants. The coordination equilibrium is 
stable neither because of sanctions or external incentives, nor because 
members of Congress, out of public spiritedness, dedicate themselves 
to the mission of Congress, but simply because no one has an interest 
in overturning it.l5 
It is difficult to see why Hardin thinks this explains how self-interested 
individuals can be induced to serve organizational goals. To be sure, 
given the aim of passing laws, members of Congress will usually find 
that the best means of achieving this aim will be to go through the estab- 
lished committee structure. But this aim is given to them, not by their 
self-interest, but by their legislative ro1es.16 If they were purely self-inter- 
ested, why would they bother passing laws at all? Why wouldn’t they just 
collect their salaries and perks? It merely defers the puzzle to reply that 
14. See, however, Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989), pp. 329-67 for a searching critique of Lewis’s theory. 
15. Russell Hardin, “Institutional Commitment: Values or Incentives?” in EVO, pp. 
422-23. 
16. A state of affairs is in a person’s interest only if someone who loved that person 
would want that state for that person’s sake. Stephen Darwall, “Self-Interest and Self- 
Concern,” Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1997): 158-78. Most of the goals given to work- 
ers and officeholders by their roles are not like that. It would be absurd to suppose, for 
example, that someone who loved a congressperson would desire that many of the laws 
she votes for (which advance only the interests of certain subgroups) exist for her sake, 
apart from any rewards attached to her passing these laws. One might say: isn’t the state 
of her successfully passing laws good for her? I reply: success in a role--achievement of its 
intrinsic goals--cannot be seen as advancing one’s self-interest unless one judges those 
goals independently worthwhile. For something not worth doing is not worth doing well. 
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if they didn’t do their jobs, the voters would turn them out of office. For 
why would self-interested voters turn out to vote?” 
Hardin’s model depends on the existence of coordination conven- 
tions that provide sufficient self-interested incentives for other agents 
to perform their institutionally given roles in sanctioning deviant agents 
and rewarding compliant agents. But he never manages to show how 
the whole incentive system can get off the ground without some agents 
(for example, voters) engaging in sanctioning for other than self-inter- 
ested reasons. Moreover, in the classic coordination model, exemplified 
by the right-hand-driving norm, the equilibrium norm can be costlessly 
established by spontaneous convergence on a salient rule. By contrast, 
the establishment of organizational constitutions is costly, and requires 
explicit agreement. A collective-action problem therefore already had to 
be solved to establish the coordination equilibrium. Thus, Hardin’s 
model covertly depends on non-self-interested motivations doing a lot 
of the work off-stage. 
Hardin’s failure to address these issues suggests that the conventional 
wisdom on coordination conventions is correct: at best, they explain 
only a small range of social norms. One might argue that cooperative 
behavior arises in coordination games, where it is in everyone’s interest 
to cooperate, and persists as a habit in other contexts, because people 
cannot be bothered to reconsider the merits of cooperation on a case- 
by-case basis. This argument might be plausible if cooperation were 
insensitive to context. Yet it varies not only with the payoffs, but with 
other variables such as interpersonal trust, group identification, and 
vulnerability to severe loss if others do not cooperate. 
111. RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND SOCIAL NORMS (11): 
REPEATED GAME THEORY 
Some rational choice theorists have claimed a promising solution to 
collective-action problems in repeated game theory. The main result to 
which they appeal is that mutual conditional cooperation (tit-for-tat) is 
an equilibrium strategy in indefinitely repeated two-person Prisoners’ 
Dilemmas, provided the parties have perfect information and do not 
17. On the difficulties of accounting for voting behavior in rational choice terms, see 
Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice (New Haven: Yale Univer- 
sity Press, 1994). 
179 Beyond Homo Economicus: 
New Developments in 
Theories of Social Norms 
discount the future too steeply.18 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
claim that such repeated games occur with unusually high frequency in 
“communities,” which they define as social institutions with high entry 
and exit costs and nonanonymous interactions. These features limit 
migration and foster parochiality-a tendency to favor in-group over 
outgroup interactions.lg Parochial communities sacrifice the gains 
from trade that could be achieved in open markets from interaction 
with strangers. They offset this disadvantage by fostering prosocial 
traits such as cooperativeness and honesty. Communities reduce the 
cost and increase the value of information on who can be trusted, 
thereby increasing the value to individuals of having a good reputation. 
Low information costs also foster social segmentation-a tendency of 
cooperators to play with other cooperators-which internalizes the 
noncontractable benefits of prosocial behavior to prosocial individu- 
als, and excludes antisocial individuals from cooperative interactions. 
Repeated interaction also makes retaliation against cheaters a cost- 
effective strategy.20 
Bowles and Gintis combine rational choice theory and evolutionary 
game theory into a theory of cultural evolution. If individuals emulate 
strategies that have proven successful, then the strategies that will be 
replicated in communities will be prosocial. However, communities will 
not survive if there is too much migration. To prevent this, migration 
must be costly. Emigration might be costly either because prospective 
migrants calculate that cooperative opportunities are richer inside their 
community, or because parochiality is a cultural (intrinsic) value for 
them. Bowles and Gintis appear to take the first option, arguing that 
18. Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, ig87), chap. 3; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York Basic 
Books, 1984); Lee Alan Dugatkin, Cooperation AmongAnimals: An Evolutionary Perspective 
(New York Oxford University Press, i997), pp. 19-30. Dugatkin provides a concise and 
sobering summary of the main results from tinkering with Axelrods iterated PD evolution- 
ary model. The result stated in the text reports the implication of the folk theorems of 
repeated game theory that has received the most attention from social theorists. The folk 
theorems actually imply that there are many possible equilibrium strategies (not just tit- 
for-tat) in indefinitely repeated PDs, and, more generally, that numerous mutually benefi- 
cial cooperative equilibria can obtain in many indefinitely repeated games for which the 
rational strategy in a single play of the game would be uncooperative. 
19. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, “How Communities Govern: The Structural 
Basis of Prosocial Norms,” in EVO, pp. 208-9. 
20. Ibid. 
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communities will survive because individuals need them to solve collec- 
tive-action problems that arise with unenforceable contracts.21 This 
supposes that there is a big difference between how much people trust 
one another inside and outside their communities. But Fehr and 
Gachter show that, at least in their Swiss subject populations, trust and 
cooperation among strangers in one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas are re- 
markably common. The same results should be expected in any country 
whose residents are used to successfully interacting with strangers in 
the impersonal institutions of the market and the state. 
One might argue that these observations undermine Bowles and Gin- 
tis’s local thesis-that parochial communities are needed to solve col- 
lective-action problems-without touching their larger insight, that re- 
peated game theory explains how collective-action problems are solved. 
Impersonal markets have trust-building substitutes for personal knowl- 
edge of one’s trading partner, such as brand names and franchises. 
However, a collective-action problem already had to be solved before 
the situation of brand-name and franchised companies could be repre- 
sented as an iterated game. Different franchises of the same company 
must already be correctly regarded as part of the same collective agency. 
Absent this, a customer’s visits to different Burger Kings on her travels 
would count merely as a succession of one-shot games. 
Repeated game theory with rational egoist players thus explains much 
less cooperation than is actually observed. Moreover, it is not evident 
that the representative collective-action problem is best modeled as a 
two-person Prisoners’ Dilemma. Many social norms are enacted in situ- 
ations better modeled by other iterated games, such as chicken and 
Hawk-Dove.2z Rational egoists often fail to generate prosocial behavior 
in these games. In the Hawk-Dove game, “Hawk represents the strategy 
of fighting for possession of some good, and “Dove” represents the 
strategy of yielding to a fight. The payoffs make Hawk the best strategy 
for a player if the other plays Dove, and Dove the best strategy for a 
player if the other plays Hawk. Robert Sugden shows that even small 
21. However, on p. 224 they postulate that parochial cultural values will reduce the rate 
of migration and thereby reinforce the ability of communities to promote prosocial values. 
The implications of this alternative will be discussed in Section VII. 
22. Michael Taylor, “Cooperation and Rationality: Notes on the Collective Action Prob- 
lem and Its Solutions,” in The Limits ofRutionulity, ed. Karen Schweers Cook and Marga- 
ret Levi (Chicago: Chicago University Press, i990), pp. 222-40. 
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degrees of uncertainty about others’ payoffs in repeated Hawk-Dove 
games often lead to a Hobbesian equilibrium of a war of all against all 
(everyone playing Hawk-Hawk), if rational agents are motivated only by 
material payoffs. He concludes that, under realistic knowledge condi- 
tions, Homo economicus cannot reliably sustain property conventions, 
which are represented as equilibria in which the possessor of a resource 
plays Hawk and the other player plays Dove.‘3 
lY RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND SOCIAL NORMS (111): SANCTIONS 
The third main rational choice strategy for explaining why people obey 
social norms is to appeal to the sanctions attached to them.’4 This strat- 
egy suffers from several difficulties. (1) It appears only to defer the prob- 
lem, for it is costly for agents to impose sanctions.’s How, then, is a 
norm of sanctioning to be sustained? To argue that the failure to sanc- 
tion must itself be sanctioned leads to an infinite regress. (2) In any 
event, we rarely sanction failures to sanction violations of social 
norms.26 (3) Indeed, we actually observe norms against sanctioning 
breaches of some norms. It is considered rude to point out others’ rude- 
ness, and tattling is often frowned upon, even among those who en- 
dorse the norms tattlers want enforced. (4) The probability of getting 
caught and punished for disobedience bears little relation to the level of 
23. Robert Sugden, “Normative Expectations: The Simultaneous Evolution of Institu- 
tions and Norms,” in EVO, pp. 73-100. 
24. Leading examples of this strategy include Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Sob 
idarity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987); James Coleman, 
Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
25. Little is gained by supposing that some people just like to bully others into following 
social norms. If it is supposed that they bully people to follow the norms because and only 
when violations hurt their self-interest, then it is mysterious why so many norms tell peo- 
ple to be polite, cooperative, and fair to everyone, rather than just to bullies. Revenge also 
explains little: (a) many norms benefit people from being generally observed, although the 
injury to anyone from a single violation is too negligible and impersonal to motivate re- 
venge. It is absurd to exact revenge against someone for littering on public property, or 
even for evading taxes. When the costs of deviance are highly diffused rather than person- 
ally directed, as in most norms providing for the production or protection of public goods, 
revenge is not a plausible motivation for sanctioning. (b) In any event, there are norms 
against revenge. (c) Revenge is itself a norm-governed practice inexplicable in terms of 
rational choice theory. See Jon Elster, “Norms of Revenge,” Ethics 100 (1990): 862-85. 
26. For the first two arguments, see Jon Elster, The Cement ofsociety (Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1989), pp. 132-33. 
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compliance with legal norms. For example, among Swiss taxpayers, the 
probability of detection and the penalty tax rate do not predict the ex- 
tent of tax evasi0n.~7 
Finally, (5) the theory supposes that acceptance of the authority or 
endorsement of the underlying social or impersonal point of the norm 
plays no motivating role in sustaining it. Since people‘s opinions about 
the general impersonal merits of a norm are supposed to be motivation- 
ally inert, it follows that even if everyone thought the norm was perni- 
cious, they would still comply with it because everyone would be re- 
warding or punishing everyone else for compliance with or deviance 
from the norm. This is absurd. Why would people enforce a norm that 
no one endorses? 
Such a situation is possible if everyone mistakenly believes that others 
approve of the norm and are ready to punish others for deviance. Timur 
Kuran argues that this situation sustained the Communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe even after nearly everyone had become disillusioned 
with Communism. Such situations are, like the pretense that the em- 
peror has new clothes, highly unstable. After it became common knowl- 
edge that no one believed in Communism, the norms sustaining these 
regimes collapsed.28 This implies that, under common knowledge of 
people’s opinions of a norm, recognition of its normativity is not moti- 
vationally inert. For sanctions to get off the ground, either most people, 
or a core of influential people, must accept the impersonal authority of 
the norm and make this their reason for undertaking the costs of sanc- 
tioning. And if the normativity of the norm is a good reason for an indi- 
vidual to undertake the costs of sanctioning, it should also be a good 
reason for an individual to undertake the costs of complying with it. 
Sanctions therefore cannot supply the fundamental reason why people 
obey social norms. 
How could sanctioning theory escape these five problems? Rational 
choice theorists have been most sensitive to the regress argument. To 
cut the regress short, one must identify a sanction that is either costless 
to the sanctioner, or automatic. An automatic sanction would not re- 
quire intentional action, and might thus evade the first four problems. 
The only credible candidate for such a sanction is the emotions of ap- 
27. Bruno S .  Frey, “Institutions and Morale: The Crowding-Out Effect,” in EVO, 452-54. 
28. Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Fal- 
sification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
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proval and disapproval other people feel upon observing someone obey 
or disobey a norm.’g 
Robert Sugden, and Chaim Fershtman and Yoram Weiss develop 
emotional sanctioning models of why people obey social norms.30 To fit 
within a rational choice framework, such models make three assump- 
tions. (1) People approve and disapprove of others for obeying or diso- 
beying norms. (2) These feelings are costless and/or automatic and un- 
intended. (3) People want others’ approval. 
Besides providing incentives to obey social norms, moral sentiments 
are needed to explain the normativity of norms-their being regarded 
as impersonally authoritative rules that everyone ought to obey. Sugden 
argues that normative expectations account for the normativity of 
norms. Normative expectations exist when people resent others for 
frustrating both their empirical expectations of conformity to a rule and 
their interests. Because people feel unease at being the target of others’ 
resentment, normative expectations give them an incentive to conform 
to rules. 
Emotional sanctions can arguably solve the first three problems with 
sanctioning theories. (Let us set aside the fourth problem, of explaining 
why people conform to norms even when unobserved.) The hallmark of 
a rational choice explanation of norms is its denial that an agent’s ac- 
ceptance of the normativity of a norm plays a direct role in motivating 
her compliance with it. Sugden’s model confirms this: it is not her own 
approval of the norm that motivates her to conform to it, but rather 
other people’s normative expectations that motivate her to conform. The 
fifth challenge to sanctioning theories says that this is incoherent. What- 
ever motivates an individual to sanction others for deviance also gives 
her a direct reason to comply. 
So, if resentment can cause other people to comply with a norm, it 
can also cause the people feeling it to comply. Against this, one might 
argue that one would never resent oneselffor violating a norm, because 
resentment is directed only at what frustrates one’s own interests. How- 
ever, if resentment reflected only an individual’s self-concern, it could 
hardly function as a sanction. Sanctions are needed to motivate people 
29. For this argument, see Philip Pettit, “Virtus Norrnativa: Rational Choice Perspec- 
30. Robert Sugden, “Normative Expectations”; Chaim Fershtman and Yoram Weiss, 
tives,” Ethics 100 (1990): mj-55. 
“Why Do We Care What Others Think About Us?” in EVO, pp. 133-50. 
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who don’t already care about the interests of others. If an agent does not 
care about another’s interests, why would she care about his self-inter- 
ested feelings? 
Sugden recognizes this fact and follows Hume in insisting on the im- 
partiality of the moral sentiments. He asks, why, when traveling on a 
crowded train without a seat, don’t I take the seat of someone who 
leaves it to go to the toilet? He answers, because it is not just she who 
would resent me for taking the seat; everyone else, accepting the con- 
vention that such seats are not to be taken, would take her side and 
share her resentment of me. My unease at being exposed to the impar- 
tial ill will of many other people deters me.3 Sugden’s explanation as- 
sumes that people feel resentment on behalf of others, not just them- 
selves. But, assuming he shares the same moral sentiments as others, he 
should by his own lights reproach himself for taking the passenger’s 
seat. He should not need to rely on the reproach of others to motivate 
him, since, given the impartiality of his moral sentiments, they can just 
as easily be directed against himself as against any other person. Sugden 
may doubt whether self-reproach could motivate people to follow coop- 
erative norms against their self-interest. But why should the reproach of 
others be more powerful? “What are my feelings of self-reproach to me?” 
is a less compelling question than “What are their feelings to me3’’3* 
Emotional sanctions, no less than behavioral sanctions, fall prey to the 
objection that whatever motivates the sanctions can directly motivate 
compliance with a norm. Sanctions are only a supplementary motive to 
the original motive for compliance, without which the norm would 
never have been established: acceptance of the normativity or imper- 
sonal authority of the norm. 
v. EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF SOCIAL NORMS 
An evolutionary explanation of a trait explains its frequency in a popula- 
tion in terms of selective pressures that favor or disfavor its replication 
relative to its alternatives in a particular environment. A full evolution- 
31. Robert Sugden, “Normative Expectations,” p. 85. 
32. One might suppose that the reproach of others would be more powerful because it 
causes embarrassment or a loss of status. But these facts would rationally motivate people 
only if they already cared about others’ normative judgments about how their actions 
ought to affect others’ interests. Why would people care about such judgments if they do 
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ary explanation of any trait involves three mechanisms: (a) a mecha- 
nism for generating a diversity of traits; (b) a mechanism for replicating 
these traits; and (c) a mechanism for selecting some traits over others 
to be favorably replicated, on the basis of the consequences or “payoffs” 
of expressing them in the environment. These mechanisms need not be 
biological. If cultural mechanisms could be identified that play roles 
(a) - (c), they would ground an autonomous theory of cultural evolution. 
The marriage of evolutionary theory with game theory has raised 
hopes for such a theory. The key contribution of game theory to evolu- 
tionary theory is the thought that the primary determinant of the pay- 
offs of any particular social trait is the frequency distribution of itself 
and its alternatives in the population. In successive rounds of the game 
of life, people (or their descendants) are assumed to adjust (or inherit) 
their social traits in response to the payoffs from expressing those traits 
in the previous round. This allows the creation of mathematically tracta- 
ble endogenous theories of social traits. 
One can create a game-theoretic model of cultural evolution that gen- 
erates any social outcome one likes, if one is free to choose one’s start- 
ing assumptions. To avoid a “just so’’ story, the assumptions of an evo- 
lutionary model should meet the following constraints.33 (1) Physical re- 
alizubility. The postulated selection, replication, and generation mecha- 
nisms should be consistent with human capabilities and limitations. (2)  
Representativeness. The game being played should be representative of 
critical, enduring, frequently encountered features of the interactive en- 
vironment our ancestors faced. (3) Robustness. The desired social out- 
come should be generated under a variety of starting conditions (such 
as initial frequency distribution of social traits) and should not hang on 
implausible conditions (such as perfect information and flawless execu- 
tion of strategies). Since we do not know the specifics about our an- 
cestors’ environment, the outcome should hang on its generally repre- 
sentative features and not on rigging the details in peculiar ways. (4) 
Avoidance of anachronism. The model should not project onto the past 
not already care about others’ interests? The general problem is that emotions have an 
evaluative basis. It is hard to credit emotions with intrinsic reason-giving force without 
crediting the evaluations that justify those emotions with comparable reason-giving force. 
33. This list is drawn from the important article by Justin D’Arms, Robert Batterman, 
and Krzyzstof G6my, “Game Theoretic Explanations and the Evolution of Justice,” Philos- 
ophy of Science 65 (1998): 76-102. 
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human capabilities, social settings, and problems that have emerged 
only recently. This is a logical implication of realizability and represen- 
tativeness, but worth stating separately to remind us of the temporal 
dimension implicit in these criteria. 
Game-theoretic models of cultural evolution differ according to the 
unit of selection. Some models endogenize strategies or behaviors; oth- 
ers endogenize underlying motivational states. When an evolutionary 
model endogenizes behaviors, it explains the frequency distribution of 
these behaviors. It does not explain their normative status: the fact that 
agents judge that people ought to behave in that way and hold each 
other to account for their behaviors. Thus, it is odd for evolutionary 
game theorists such as Brian Skyrms to claim that, in demonstrating 
that.the strategy of splitting windfalls evenly among finders is an evolu- 
tionarily stable equilibrium, he is explaining “the origin of our concept 
of justice.”34 How does it explain the fact that we consider unequal divi- 
sions of windfalls unfair, as opposed to unexpected?35 
A more promising strategy for explaining the evolution of norms 
would take some underlying motivational state as the unit of selection. 
A suitably selected motivational state could simultaneously supply a 
mechanism for norm-conforming behavior and explain the normativity 
of the norm. This is in keeping with the conclusion defended above, that 
the normativity of a norm plays an indispensable role in motivating con- 
formity with it. Sugden, Chaim Fershtman and Yoram Weiss, and Ken 
Binmore all take motivational states as their unit of selection. 
Fershtman and Weiss present a model of the evolution of a preference 
to care about the opinions of others concerning how one ought to be- 
h a ~ e . 3 ~  Suppose people costlessly confer social esteem on those who 
cooperate more than average in Prisoners’ Dilemmas, and pass on their 
34. Brian Skyrms, The Evolution of the Social Contract (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press, 19961, p. 21. 
35. Sugden claims that his concept of normative expectations accounts for normativity 
by grounding resentment? without agents’ presupposing any judgments of how others 
ought to behave. Mansbridge objects that, unless one judges that others are obligated to 
behave as one expects, that they frustrate one’s expectations will lead only to irritation, 
not resentment. Mansbridge, “Starting with Nothing,” pp. 162-63. Sugden replies that re- 
quiring the moral sentiments to have normative content violates a naturalistic constraint 
on social scientific explanation. Sugden, “Normative Expectations,” p. 84. But all that 
Mansbridge requires is that people represent the objects of their resentment as having 
acted unjustly, not that their representations are true. 
36. Fershtman and Weiss, “Why Do We Care What Others Think About Us?” 
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preference for esteem to their children. Fershtman and Weiss identify 
conditions in which a preference for esteem can spread under natural 
selection, even if only material payoffs increase reproductive fitness. 
Those who prefer social esteem triumph because only they reap the 
material gains of cooperation in PDs. 
Fershtman and Weiss’s model has heuristic value against those who 
think that ruthless materialists must drive people who care about oth- 
ers’ opinions into extinction. However, it is neither realizable nor repre- 
sentative, because its reproductive mechanism is implicitly asexual. 
(They assume that one’s children will inherit one’s preference for es- 
teem. What preference would the offspring of two parents with different 
preferences have?) Suppose we introduced sexual reproduction, and 
hence sexual selection, into their model. Everyone will prefer to mate 
with people who care about their opinions. Social esteem based on re- 
sponsiveness to others’ opinions must therefore have a direct impact on 
one’s reproductive fitness. So it is not plausible to assume that repro- 
ductive fitness depends only on material payoffs. 
Ken Binmore offers an evolutionary explanation of normative prefer- 
ences.37 He argues that a fairness norm akin to the Golden Rule, as mod- 
eled by reasoning behind an original position, evolved with the human 
species. We apply this norm by asking how we would prefer goods to be 
distributed, on the supposition that we have an equal chance of being 
any of the parties to a distributive problem. To answer this question, 
each person must consult her empathetic preferences: would I rather be 
Adam in condition X or Eve in condition Y? These preferences express 
interpersonal utility comparisons. Individuals must come to share the 
same empathetic preferences if the original position device is to serve 
its evolutionary function as a standard for joint decision making. The 
rational choice of distributions is then made by maximizing expected 
utility as defined by empathetic preferences. The resulting norm of jus- 
tice is utilitarian, but with a contractualist rather than a teleological ra- 
tionale. Binmore deserves credit for recognizing the autonomy of nor- 
mative motivation, instead of trying to explain normative conformity by 
37. Ken Binmore, “A Utilitarian Theory of Political Legitimacy,” in EVO, pp. 101-32. Bin- 
more’s theory, like Skyrms’s, focuses more on the content of norms than on the motive 
for compliance with them. For another discussion of both problems, including a more 
thorough discussion of Binmore and Skyrms, see Peter Vanderschraaf, “Game Theory, 
Evolution, and Justice,” Philosophy C Public Affairs 28, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 324-58. 
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appealing to self-interest or the desire for social approval. Let us test his 
model against the criteria articulated above. 
Physical reuZizubiZity. Binmore postulates that, in negotiating the just 
distribution of resources, the parties will bargain for shares based on 
their empathetic preferences. “Both players will test their recom- 
mended bargaining strategy against the[ir] empathetic preferences . . . 
and adjust their behavior until they reach a Nash equilibrium of their 
bargaining game.”s8 This supposes that our ancestors were able to max- 
imize their expected (empathetic) utilities. Only modern decision theo- 
rists are able to do this consciously. Binmore must be imagining, then, 
that some unconscious process steered ordinary mortals to the same 
results. But the evidence against the hypothesis that humans generally 
are “as if” expected utility maximizers is overwhelming. Binmore’s se- 
lection mechanism therefore lacks a plausible embodiment.39 
Representativeness. Binmore assumes that the original position device 
offers a plausible representation of negotiation over fair terms of distri- 
bution among our ancestors. This requires identifying a concrete dis- 
tributive problem in which this device could have evolved as a joint 
decision-making rule. Binmore’s choice of Adam and Eve negotiating 
over the terms of their marriage is anachronistic. For most of human 
history, women have not been parties to a marriage negotiation. They 
have been the objects of negotiation between their male kin and the 
prospective husband and his male kin. Nothing hangs on the marriage 
illustration, however, since Binmore’s analysis would have run the same 
course whatever distributive problem he chose. There lies the problem. 
In commonsense moral thinking, we find numerous conflicting stan- 
dards of local justice: need, desert, property entitlement, status, con- 
tract, first come-first serve, finders keepers, equal shares, and so forth. 
It is plausible to think that each of these evolved to solve specific local 
distributive problems: perhaps need for distribution among kin, con- 
tract for trade between alien tribes, equal shares among finders for 
windfalls, desert for dividing gains from cooperation among partici- 
pants in joint production. Explicit contractualist and utilitarian princi- 
38. Binmore, “A Utilitarian Theory of Political Legitimacy,” p. 115. 
39. This argument does not discredit all rational choice explanations of social phenom- 
ena. In certain institutional contexts, such as competitive markets, the results predicted 
by rational choice theory can be generated by only a few rational actors at the margins. 
The trouble with Binmore’s evolutionary argument is that it requires people in general to 
be endowed with the skills and preference structure of Homo economicus. 
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ples offer standards of global, not local, justice. As such, they arrived 
very recently, as philosophical attempts to reconcile conflicts among 
local standards. To avoid anachronism, Binmore assumes that the orig- 
inal position device first evolved as a standard of local justice and only 
later became a global tool to be applied to the whole social 0rder.4~ He 
therefore needs to identify a representative local distributive problem 
for which the use of the original position device was an evolutionarily 
stable solution. Marriage isn’t an apt choice, but what would be? 
Perhaps Binmore thinks that all the local standards of justice implic- 
itly encode contractualist-utilitarian reasoning. This makes the variety 
of local standards difficult to comprehend. The core assumption of con- 
tractualist-utilitarian reasoning is that equal units of welfare count 
equally for decision making, no matter who enjoys them. The core as- 
sumption of local standards of justice is that how, and how much, peo- 
ple ought to concern themselves with the interests of others depends on 
their relationship to them: are they equals or unequals? Stranger, tribe 
member, friend, or kin? 
To his credit, Binmore does try capture the realities of power differ- 
ences in assigning weights to different people’s utilities. But he captures 
these differences in the thought that the powerful doubt that the lower 
orders suffer as much from the same deprivations as the higher orders 
do. This preserves an egalitarian decision principle (each person’s utili- 
ties still count the same) and packs the power differences into empa- 
thetic preferences. The powerful in most inegalitarian societies have en- 
tertained few illusions about the welfare enjoyed by the lower orders 
under the distributive principles they thought were just. They packed 
the power differences into inegalitarian decision principles that distrib- 
uted goods according to social status and function rather than subjec- 
tive utilities. The thought “being of inferior status, her interests count 
for little” is not to be modeled as the thought “she would not suffer as 
much from the same deprivation as I would.” 
Avoidance of anachronism. The idea that norms of justice are based 
on interpersonal comparisons of subjective utilities arises fundamen- 
tally in worldviews that assume that subjective utilities-preferences 
that people hold apartfrom any feelings of obligation to hold them-are 
the ultimate basis of human decision making. Such worldviews are of 
40. Binmore, “A Utilitarian Theory of Political Legitimacy,” p. 129. 
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recent origin, because the institutional conditions for their plausibility 
are modern. For most people to be in a position to develop subjective 
preferences covering a wide range of decision problems requires a social 
order in which they are free to choose ways of life that are not compre- 
hensively defined by ascriptive social identities and social roles. This 
requires such conditions as a substantial economic surplus distributed 
by free and impersonal markets, elimination of caste, differentiation of 
social spheres, individual mobility between spheres, expansive rights to 
privacy, social norms of tolerance, and the widespread adoption of a 
conception of the self as the proper author of its own priorities. These 
are very late developments in human history. In societies lacking these 
conditions, the vast majority of people make claims to resources on be- 
half of their role-given goals and ascriptive identities. They have few 
subjective preferences on which to base claims, and those that exist 
have little standing, even in their own eyes. Interpersonal comparisons 
are based on judgments of the social importance of their roles and 
identities. 
The great philosopher-economist John Stuart Mill was acutely aware 
of the historical contingency of “subjective utilities.” That is why he 
wrote a book urging people to acquire them, and to create the social 
conditions in which everyone else could, t 0 0 . 4 ~  Today’s economists as- 
sume that wide-ranging subjective utilities are a given of human nature, 
rather than a stunning social achievement. In evolutionary theorizing, 
this assumption runs the risk of anachronism. It misrepresents wide- 
ranging subjective utilities as the general cause of social norms and in- 
stitutions throughout history rather than as the recent effect of pecu- 
liarly modern institutions. 
Evolutionary theory is needed to explain how our general psycholog- 
ical capacities to adopt and obey social norms evolved. Whether it can 
explain how particular social norms came about remains to be seen. The 
most acute need for theories of cultural evolution is to find a realizable 
selection mechanism for cultural traits. Natural selection works in the 
long run, but it cannot explain short-run cultural change-that is, most 
of the change observed in recorded history. The main alternative selec- 
tion mechanism used in evolutionary game theory is rational choice (as 
41. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: J. W. Parker and Son, 1859). 
191 Beyond Homo Economicus: 
New Developments in 
Theories of Social Norms 
defined by decision theory). This is not physically realizable in the gen- 
eral population. Models of bounded rationality may be more promising. 
VI. SOCIAL RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL NORMS 
The great puzzle of social norms is not why people obey them, even 
when it is not in their self-interest to do so. It is, how do shared stan- 
dards of conduct ever acquire their normativity to begin with? Once we 
understand this, there is no further difficulty in understanding the mo- 
tive to obey them. We obey them, because we believe that we ought to. 
We accept them as authoritative principles of action. This is the guiding 
idea of Homo sociologicus-that people obey norms because they have 
“internalized them. Social rationality stakes its claim on the idea that 
the normativity or “oughtness” of social norms is not the “ought” of 
prudence. Nor is it the “ought” of morality. Many social norms, such as 
norms of fashion, have no moral content. So what is it? We need an 
account of how a social norm can provide an intelligible ground for 
action. 
Viviana Zelizer hints at this in her discussion of the distinctions 
among compensations, entitlements, gifts, and bribes.4‘ She argues that 
the relationship between the parties determines how to classify a pay- 
ment from one person to another. For example, many people consider 
it an improper bribe when a parent pays her child to do chores. Why? 
A payment is a bribe when the compensation to the recipient is for a 
performance that is either not authorized by the relationship or re- 
quired by the relationship without payment.43 As family members and 
not employees, children are expected to do their part in household 
chores without payment. Properly socialized children in fact do so, ac- 
cepting this expectation as an authoritative action-guiding norm. 
Let us unpack the reasoning that could make this intelligible.44 Sup- 
pose a child regards herself as a member of her family, and regards her 
family as a group of people dedicated to living together and therefore to 
working as a body to provide the conditions for doing so. Suppose she 
a. Zelizer, “How Do We Know Whether a Monetary Transaction is a Gift, an Entitle- 
43. Zelizer, “Gift, Entitlement, or Compensation?” p. 332. 
44. This follows the model provided by Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts, pp. 422-24. 
ment, or Compensation?”, 329-31. 
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regards completing household chores as constituting what her family 
sees as some of those conditions. In taking up this understanding of her 
practical identity, constituted by membership in a family, and this un- 
derstanding of her family’s goal, she thereby regards herself as commit- 
ted to that shared goal, and thus to doing her part in advancing it. Her 
commitment constitutes her reason for doing her chores. This reason- 
ing nowhere appeals to the prospect of monetary payment, parental 
approval, punishment for failure to do chores, or any other incentive. 
This is a paradigm of practical reasoning. To count as a reason for ac- 
tion, a consideration must appeal to a person’s self-understanding, not 
her self-interest. It must fit in to her understanding of her identity. 
Most people’s identities are largely, although not exclusively, consti- 
tuted by their membership in social groups or collective agents. Theo- 
ries of collective agency have recently enjoyed a great revival.45 Here I 
shall focus on the theory of Margaret Gilbert’s, which I find most prom- 
ising. According to Gilbert, a social group is a “plural subject”: a set of 
people who think of themselves as “we,” and understand one another 
to be jointly committed to some goal, belief, or principle of acti0n.4~ In 
so identifylng with a group, an individual accepts responsibility for 
doing her part in advancing the group’s goal. If the group is organized, 
she may find herself in a specific role within the organization, and she 
may thereby accept as her goals those given to her by her social role. 
This supplies an elegant answer to Hardin’s question of how people 
can be motivated to advance organizational goals. The answer does not 
presume that incentives and sanctions are not necessary to sustain or- 
ganizations. A member’s commitment to advance organizational goals 
is conditional on enough of the others doing their part to sustain an 
understanding that the members really constitute a coherent group. In 
the standard employer-employee relationship, the employee’s com- 
mitment is conditional on the employer’s playing his part, which in- 
cludes paying compensation for work performed. Compensatory in- 
45. Exemplary works include A. C. Baier, The Commons of the Mind (Chicago and La 
Salle: Open Court, 1996); J. Searle, “Collective Intentions and Actions,” in Intentions in 
Communication, ed. €? Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. Pollack (Cambridge, MA. MIT Press, 
iggo), pp. 401-15; Michael Bratman, “Shared Intention,” Ethics 104 (1993): 97-113; R. 
Tuomela, A Theory of Social Action (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984); David Velleman, “How to 
Share an Intention,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 29-50; Marga- 
ret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
46. Gilbert, On Social Facts, pp. 204-5. 
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centives may be needed to recruit willing people into organizational 
roles. 
This account provides a more general explanation of the need for 
negative sanctions than self-interest theory does. They are needed to 
motivate those who do not fully identify with their role in a group. Peo- 
ple may shirk not only out of self-interest, but out of identification with 
conflicting social roles (a man might be poorly motivated to perform 
tasks he regards as “women’s work”), out of an inability to see oneself 
as absorbed in the task (a worker might find it boring), out of pride (a 
worker might find a task demeaning), or out of any number of other 
self-understandings that conflict with regarding oneself as committed 
to the task. Sanctions mobilize self-interest against the full range of 
other motivations. They also provide assurance to conditional coopera- 
tors that others will cooperate to the degree necessary to call forth their 
own cooperation. 
This account of group identification explains the motive to comply 
with a norm in terms of its normativity. Gilbert defines a social conven- 
tion or norm as a principle of action jointly accepted by a group as a 
simple fiat.47 (A fiat is a principle regarded as authoritative in virtue of 
its joint acceptance, over and above whatever other justification might 
be offered for it.) In jointly accepting the principle of action, each mem- 
ber of the group regards herself as committed to doing her part in up- 
holding the principle with the others. To regard us as being jointly com- 
mitted to a principle is to regard each of us as thereby having a reason 
to comply, and to accept that everyone is accountable to everyone else 
with respect to c0mpliance.4~ The normativity or “oughtness” of social 
norms, then, is an “ought” constitutive of commitments of collective 
agency. It is grounded in the perspective of collective agency, in “our” 
shared view of how “we” ought to behave. It is based on the fact that 
members accept the authority of “us” to determine how each should 
behave in the domain defined by the norm. 
How should motivation by norms be represented in relation to other 
motives? Ben-Ner and Putterman, as well as Frey, represent individual 
values, including commitments to obey norms, as arguments in the in- 
47. Gilbert, On Social Facts, p. 373. 
48. This account does not distinguish joint acceptance from joint commitment. For an 
argument that commitments provide reasons for action, see my “Reasons, Attitudes, and 
Values: Replies to Sturgeon and Piper,” Ethics 106 (1996): 538-54. 
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dividual’s utility function, as just one preference among others to be 
satisfied.49 This enables theorists to represent cases in which the indi- 
vidual chooses to sacrifice her values in favor of her interests. Timur 
Kuran objects that this misrepresents the distinctive motivational struc- 
ture and function of values.50 Evolution endowed us with discrete moti- 
vational systems: preferences are subject to trade-offs, whereas values 
(as Kuran defines them) present themselves as obligatory to the agent- 
as not subject to trade-offs. Preferences and values define distinct and 
potentially conflicting orderings within the self. Conflicts within the self 
are endemic, because there is no general function of the brain that rec- 
onciles all of our motivations. 
Kuran’s ideas point toward a more fruitful way of representing the 
relation of values and preferences. But he throws away his insights when 
he suggests that, in cases of “moral overload,” when an individual’s val- 
ues demand the impossible, individuals deal with the prospect of guilt 
by just trading off the intrinsic utility of their options (as represented by 
their preferences) with their moral utility (as represented by their val- 
ues).S1 This denies the distinctiveness of value-based motivation that 
Kuran was keen to uphold. It also postulates the very unified utility 
function that Kuran previously rejected, on the grounds that there is no 
brain function for reconciling our motivational conflicts. Of course 
there is such a brain function. It is called reason. Kuran himself invokes 
an implicit conception of reason in explaining intrapersonal conflict 
resolution. His mistake is to assume that reason must operate on the 
basis of a single unified preference ordering. 
Gilbert’s account of norms permits a more fruitful way of understand- 
ing practical conflicts and their resolution. Each of us is an individual 
agent, an “I” with, let us suppose, an associated partial preference or- 
dering. Each of us is also typically a member of numerous collective 
agencies-many “we’s”-a citizen of a state, an employee of a firm, a 
member of a church, a relative in a family, and so forth-each jointly 
committed to different goals, priorities, and principles of action, repre- 
sentable in part by distinct partial preference orderings. These rankings 
conflict, because the different collective agencies are not fully coordi- 
49. Ben-Ner and Putterman, “Values and Institutions in Economic Analysis,” pp. 20,z3; 
Frey, “Institutions and Morale,” p. 440. 
50. Timur Kuran, “Moral Overload and Its Alleviation,” in EVO, pp. 231-66. 
51. Kuran, “Moral Overload,” p. 243. 
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nated with one another and do not automatically accept their members’ 
personal priorities as inputs into joint decision making. (“This spending 
bill will make me rich” is not an acceptable reason a representative can 
give to Congress for passing a bill.) Reason resolves conflicts among 
these preference orderings not by weighing one priority against an- 
other, but by determining which ranking, in the given context, has au- 
thority. This view represents reason not as a scale upon which compet- 
ing values are balanced, but as a judge drawing jurisdictional bounda- 
ries. Any given preference ordering prevails only within its jurisdic- 
tion-that is, only in contexts where its associated agent (“I”, or this or 
that “we” to which I belong) has authority to decide what I should do. 
Kuran recognizes that people may limit the scope of their normative 
commitments, thereby allowing their personal priorities to govern their 
choice. But he represents this as unprincipled and self-deceptive “casu- 
istry” and “rationalization.” Similarly, he views sphere differentiation- 
the practice of defining distinct spheres of life (publiclprivate, work/ 
home, market/state) in which people pursue different priorities, as just 
a technique for hiding our own inconsistencies from 0urselves.5~ Like 
Binmore, he is caught in the grip of a picture of reason while blind to 
the social conditions for its realization. Reason does not demand that 
all of an individual’s distinct preference rankings somehow get trans- 
lated into a single ranking: only a hermit, who belongs to no groups, or 
a subject of a single totalitarian social group, could achieve this. If we 
view the function of reason not as weighing goods given to it, but as 
assessing the authority of action-guiding principles, a system of sphere 
differentiation that grants individuals discretion to pursue their per- 
sonal priorities in the private sphere can be seen as rational, principled 
and transparent. 
mI. VALUES, INCENTIVES, AND MARKETS: NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
Two tales are often told about the relation of incentive-based market 
institutions to values. The pessimistic tale represents capitalism as de- 
pendent upon a stock of social capital-trust, norms of cooperation and 
honesty, and other prosocial values-that are cultivated by nonmarket 
institutions such as families, neighborhoods, churches, and other com- 
52. Kuran, “Moral Overload,” pp. 251-55. 
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munities. Capitalist firms freely make use of this social stock without 
replenishing it, and undermine the very institutions that are responsible 
for society’s social capital. In this tale, free markets are responsible for 
moral decline, anomie and loneliness, and eat away at their own foun- 
dations.53 The optimistic tale represents capitalism as expanding the 
scope of cooperation and trust by enabling people to reap gains from 
trade worldwide, bridging parochial divisions of nationality, religion, 
and ethnicity. Capitalism is an engine of cosmopolitanism, cooling so- 
cially dangerous passions such as religious fanaticism, and overcoming 
xenophobia.54 The impersonality, anonymity, and openness of markets 
to all comers is favorably contrasted with social orders in which people 
are tightly constrained by parochial connections and loyalties of family, 
ethnicity, and neighborhood. 
Both stories recognize that free markets cannot function efficiently on 
the basis of self-interest alone. Many contracts, especially labor con- 
tracts, are incompletely enforceable. If people were not willing to work 
harder than self-interest required, and if employers were not willing to 
reward workers for such extra effort, many potential gains from trade 
could not be reaped. Moreover, markets are efficient only to the extent 
that participants accept the rules of the game. Once people extend self- 
interested reasoning to consider whether they should lie, cheat, and 
steal, market transactions become very costly or break down. 
Given the dependency of markets on prosocial norms, we must ask 
do markets expand the scope of these norms, or undermine them? Ben- 
Ner and Putterman worry that the pessimistic tale is true. Robert Frank 
and Bruno Frey supply some evidence in favor of this view.55 Frank ar- 
gues that many social norms, such as those against conspicuous con- 
sumption, represent collectively rational “positional arms control 
agreements,” limiting competition for positional g0ods.5~ Markets can 
53. Exemplary works in this tradition include Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Social- 
ism, and Democracy (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1942); Robert Putnam, 
“Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal ofDemocracy 6 (1995): 65-78; 
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944); Fred Hirsch, Social 
Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). 
54. Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, ign) .  
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undermine such norms if they reward the people at the pinnacle of a 
positional hierarchy vastly more than those in the next tier. Frank argues 
that in such cases the state can supply substitutes for these social 
norms, such as a consumption tax. 
Frey argues that providing people with material incentives to do so- 
cially desirable things sometimes crowds out rather than supplements 
their intrinsic motivation to do them.57 Residents of one Swiss town 
identified as a potential site for a nuclear waste facility expressed less 
willingness to accept the facility in response to offers of c0mpensation.5~ 
Frey suggests that this “crowding out” effect arises because the offer of 
incentives reduces people’s sense of control over their choices and 
damages their self-esteem. 
I suggest rather that the offer of compensation changed the perceived 
relationship of the Swiss government to the town residents and thus 
changed the practical identity they assumed in contemplating the waste 
facility. In asking the residents to accept the facility without compensa- 
tion, the Swiss state addressed the residents as citizens. It implicitly 
asked them to frame their practical dilemma as: “what principle for sit- 
ing the facility should we accept, given that we (Swiss citizens, consid- 
ered collectively) must process the waste somewhere?” This way of 
framing the question precludes a not-in-my-backyard response, be- 
cause it recognizes that the facility must land in someone’s backyard. In 
offering compensation to the townspeople, the Swiss state represented 
their interest in a waste-free town as an entitlement, like a property 
right, and asked them their price for giving it up. It thereby implicitly 
asked each of them to frame their practical dilemma as: “how much is 
it worth to me (or we townspeople) to keep my town waste-free?” From 
that point of view it was harder to represent the siting of the waste facil- 
ity in their town as desirable, because they no longer saw themselves as 
responsible for solving the collective problem they faced as national 
citizens, of finding some site for the facility. Frey’s cautionary tale about 
market incentives teaches us that the offer of incentives may change the 
relations of the parties, and thereby invoke the norms and distinct pref- 
erence rankings of the new relationship. 
On the optimistic side, Bowles and Gintis argue that markets will not 
undermine the communities that nurture prosocial values, because 
57. Frey, “Institutions and Morale,” pp. 437-60. 
58. Ibid., pp. 448-51. 
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communities offer opportunities for trustworthy exchanges that indi- 
viduals cannot get elsewhere.59 Fehr and Gachter’s evidence, as well as 
our common experience in national markets, contradicts this. However, 
it may be true in communities that cultivate parochiality as a cultural 
norm, directing group members to extend their trust only to fellow 
members. In discouraging trust of outsiders, the norm of parochiality 
reduces the chances of successful interaction with them. Unsuccessful 
interactions with outsiders then reinforce parochiality. The norm of pa- 
rochiality constitutes a vicious circle, and a collective-action problem 
for members from different communities.6o 
This puts a darker cast on community than Bowles and Gintis do. To 
the extent that community members reserve action on their prosocial 
norms to fellow community members, they will not be able to function 
adequately in their roles in impersonal institutions of the market and 
state. Susan Rose-Ackerman argues that this explains why, in many de- 
veloping countries, bureaucratic corruption is pervasive, and entry into 
particular markets is limited to those with personal connections. The 
obligations of personal relationships trump those of the principal-agent 
relationship. Nepotism is the norm, and bureaucrats readily accept 
bribes to ignore the rules, or even insist on bribes just to do their jobs.61 
A solution to such problems cannot be found simply by appeal to self- 
interest and instrumental rationality. As Rose-Ackerman and Viviana 
Zelizer stress, what needs to be reformed in these cases is people’s un- 
derstanding of the meaning of their relationship to those with whom 
they are interacting. If corruption is to be reduced, bureaucrats must 
come to regard themselves as agents of the state and as public servants, 
rather than as private owners of public services for sale to the highest 
bidder, or as standing in a client-patron relationship to people who de- 
mand their services. 
Rose-Ackerman does not advocate a straight imposition of Western 
norms of impartiality on developing countries. Such norms hold out the 
prospect of greater gains from trade, but they conflict with forms of 
social relationship that their members hold dear. Because these forms 
of social relationship are not valued merely instrumentally, the instru- 
59. Bowles and Gintis, “How Communities Govern,” pp. 206-30. 
60. Baron, “Trust: Beliefs and Morality,” p. 417. 
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mental superiority of impartial norms is not likely to sway people. If 
communities are resilient, it is not because they successfully compete 
with markets, as Bowles and Gintis suppose, but because they offer 
goods, constituted by nonmarket social relationships, distinct from 
those supplied by markets. 
Thomas Weisskopf and Nancy Folbre offer a similarly measured eval- 
uation of markets, avoiding both the optimistic and pessimistic tales.62 
They assess the consequences of substituting market provision of de- 
pendent care services for care services provided by women to their fam- 
ilies. Pessimists, casting this trend as a substitution of self-interested 
motivation for direct caring, see a fatal dissolution of community and 
family bonds. Market-oriented optimists join feminists in celebrating 
this trend as a liberation of women from patriarchal coercion and as 
expanding their opportunities to participate in the public sphere. 
Weisskopf and Folbre criticize both the coercive context of patriarchal 
caregiving and the market’s dependence on self-interest. Caregiving 
provided out of direct concern for those cared for is more intrinsically 
desirable and more reliable than caregiving out of either pure self-inter- 
est or coercion. Neither incentives nor coercion are able to increase the 
supply of care services from caring motives. Nor is a more vigorous in- 
culcation of feminine norms of caring desirable, for it only leaves 
women more vulnerable to exploitation. The most just way to increase 
the supply of caring labor would be to take the gender out of norms of 
caregiving. Men are reluctant to provide much caring labor, because 
this is labeled “feminine.” If norms for caregiving were degendered, 
men would be more willing to do their share. 
Weisskopf and Folbre offer an attractive model of how to think about 
markets and values, both from a positive and a normative point of view. 
They integrate game theoretic insights (in representing the conflict be- 
tween men and women over who should provide caring labor as a kind 
of chicken game) with a recognition of the autonomy of social norms 
(in representing their content and supporting motivation as not mere 
creatures of self-interest, but bound up with culture and group identi- 
ties). They also recognize the genuine advantages of markets with their 
limitations. 
62. Folbre and Weisskopf, “Did Father Know Best? Families, Markets, and the Supply 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Economics, Values, and Organization signals an exciting breakthrough 
for the branches of social theory influenced by economics. It demon- 
strates how being open to a richer representation of human motivations 
enables more adequate accounts of market phenomena, and advances 
our understanding of the relations of markets to other social phenom- 
ena. 
We can also learn an important methodological lesson from Econom- 
ics, Values, and Organization. Throughout this review, especially in my 
discussion of repeated and evolutionary game theory, I have pointed 
out places where the unrealistic assumptions of various models lead to 
untenable explanations of social phenomena. These problems can be 
traced to the methodological advice of Milton Friedman, who counseled 
economists to ignore empirical investigation of the actual causes of 
human behavior, and content themselves with theorizing on the as- 
sumption that people behave “as if‘ they were self-interested utility 
maximizers.@ 
Imagine if Friedman were a biologist. “Don’t bother trying to figure 
out how DNA actually works,” he would say, “just stick to the idea that 
genes act ‘as if‘ they are selfish, and you will be able to explain just as 
much.” If biologists had taken this advice, they would have little more 
to show for themselves than a collection of just-so stories about how life 
evolved. Friedman’s advice confuses heuristics with science. To have a 
chance at identifymg the actual causes of social phenomena, theorists 
need to avoid the temptation to construct just-so stories and try to 
square their assumptions with empirical evidence about human moti- 
vation, capacities, and circumstances. As more such evidence emerges 
in psychology, sociology, and history, economically inspired models 
can only profit from attending to it. 
Some of the contributors to Economics, Values, and Organization 
have taken major steps in overcoming Friedman’s bad advice. Let us 
hope that economically inspired social theorists follow their example. 
63. Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in Essays in Positive 
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